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Note 
DOWNLOADING MINIMUM CONTACTS:  
THE PROPRIETY OF EXERCISING PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION BASED ON SMARTPHONE APPS 
JOANNA SIBILLA TAATJES  
As technology has changed the way in which individuals interact with each other, 
courts have sought to address how non-physical contacts with a forum state should factor 
into the analysis of whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.  
Courts have yet to decide whether a defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction in 
a state where the defendant’s only contacts with the forum took place through smartphone 
apps.  The growing prevalence of smartphones and apps, however, has brought with it the 
need for courts to consider exactly that issue.  Apps are in many ways a combination of the 
Internet and computer software, and courts have addressed the personal jurisdiction 
implications of both.  So should apps be treated the same as the Internet and websites for 
the minimum contacts inquiry?  Should they be treated more like computer software? 
This Note applies four personal jurisdiction frameworks to a hypothetical case where 
the defendant’s only contact with the forum state arises from the download of a smartphone 
app that he created.  Under three of the frameworks, I conclude that a court would likely 
find that the app created sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that 
exercising personal jurisdiction would be constitutional.  
However, establishing minimum contacts does not end the analysis.  Courts must also 
determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be fair.  I 
argue that the unique circumstances surrounding apps and their creation are such that 
exercising personal jurisdiction may not always be fair even when minimum contacts have 
been established.  
Courts were originally hostile to finding minimum contacts solely on the basis of a 
defendant’s Internet contacts with the forum state.  However, as the importance and 
prevalence of the Internet grew, so did courts’ acceptance of Internet contacts as a basis for 
exercising personal jurisdiction.  Smartphone apps are the new frontier for wireless 
interaction.  This Note concludes that the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis remains 
the best way to assess whether a defendant’s app contacts with a forum state are sufficient 
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.   
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
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a company that is in the business of gathering data on weather 
conditions from around the world.  The company employs meteorologists 
to create forecasts of what the weather will be for the next week in any 
given location based on the collected data.  This company expends 
considerable resources to collect the data, analyze it, and create the 
forecasts.  Once the forecasts are made, media outlets and websites, such 
as the New York Times and Google, pay a licensing fee to use and publish 
the forecasts.   
The company discovers that a smartphone application (“app”) that 
provides weather forecasts for locations around the world has been created, 
and the company believes that the forecasts contained in the app are its 
own.  The app is available as a free download, but the creator profits from 
the app by selling advertising space on the bottom of the screen when the 
app is displayed.  When a user opens the app, the geolocation technology 
built into the smartphone immediately displays the weather for the phone’s 
current location.  Users may also use the search function to learn the 
weather for other places.  Further investigation reveals that the app is based 
on the company’s information and that the maker of the app is not paying 
the licensing fee.   
The company brings suit in Connecticut, where it is incorporated and 
has its principal place of business.  The app creator is a single individual 
who resides in California, and he is not in the business of creating apps for 
a living.  He files a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of personal 
jurisdiction.
1
  The creator’s only contact with Connecticut is the fact that 
smartphones in Connecticut can download and have downloaded the app.  
Is personal jurisdiction proper?
2
 
This situation presents the novel question of whether personal 
                                                                                                                          
 Bowdoin College, B.A. 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013. 
1 Personal jurisdiction is a doctrine governing “[a] court’s power to bring a person into its 
adjudicative process.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009).   
2 These entities and litigation are fictional.  The scenario, however, is loosely based on the facts 
presented in West World Media, LLC v. Ikamobile Ltd., 809 F. Supp. 2d 26, 27–29 (D. Conn. 2011). 
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jurisdiction can and should be premised on a defendant’s “app” contacts 
with a forum state.
3
  The primary question is whether the fact that the app 
can be downloaded and accessed in the forum state creates sufficient 
minimum contacts.
4
  If it does, the analysis next considers whether 
exercising personal jurisdiction over the app-creating defendant would 
violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”5  
Part II of this Note begins by briefly examining the technology behind 
how smartphones, apps, and the Internet operate.  Because Internet 
personal jurisdiction doctrine is informed in part by an understanding of 
how the Internet works, comparing how the Internet functions to how 
smartphones and apps function will be instructive when examining where 
apps fit into the current personal jurisdiction framework.   
Part III then examines existing personal jurisdiction doctrines into 
which apps may fit.  Based on the technology that is discussed in Part II, 
this Note argues that smartphone apps are essentially a combination of a 
computer program and the Internet, and therefore Part III examines how 
personal jurisdiction is applied to those scenarios.   
Part IV discusses how the existing personal jurisdiction doctrines 
would be applied to apps and whether one of the current doctrines 
sufficiently addresses this novel application.  Part IV.A addresses the 
question of minimum contacts, and Part IV.B addresses whether exercising 
personal jurisdiction would satisfy the fairness requirements.  While the 
determination that the defendant has established minimum contacts is 
dispositive in most cases,
6
 this Note will argue that apps and how they are 
created present compelling issues regarding whether exercising personal 
jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON SMARTPHONES, APPS, AND THE INTERNET 
The Internet is a “global network of interconnected computers which 
allows individuals to instantaneously communicate with other[s].”7  The 
                                                                                                                          
3 This Note addresses only the question of specific personal jurisdiction.  
4 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that an out-of-state 
defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state before a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant).  
5 Id.  
6 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“This is one of those rare cases in which ‘minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play 
and substantial justice . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has 
purposefully engaged in forum activities.’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
477–78 (1985) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
7 Quinn K. Nemeyer, Comment, Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: Applying the Traditional 
Concepts of General Jurisdiction to Internet Contacts, 52 LOY. L. REV. 147, 165 (2006). 
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Internet can be accessed anywhere in the world,
8
 and it is indifferent to the 
physical location of the machines that are accessing it.  As a result, users 
frequently do not know the physical location of the other users and entities 
with whom they are interacting.
9
  Unlike with print media, content that is 
posted online is “continuous and permanent.”10   
Smartphones were introduced to the American market in the mid-to-
late 2000s.  These new devices essentially merged existing telephone and 
computer technologies into a single device
11
 which was not only capable of 
making phone calls, but also of accessing the Internet and receiving and 
sending email.  Demand for these new phones was high, and currently 35% 
of American adults own a smartphone.
12
   
Those who own smartphones take advantage of the device’s non-
traditional phone capabilities.  Eighty-seven percent of smartphone owners 
report using their phone to access the Internet or their email, including 
68% who use their smartphone to access the Internet on a typical day.
13
  Of 
those who use their smartphone to access the Internet or their email, 28% 
use their smartphone for most of their online activity.
14
   
As the market for smartphones grew, so did the market for apps.
15
  An 
“app,” which is the popular term for a software application, is a program 
that “facilitates performance of a task or retrieval of information.”16  Apps 
were originally designed to make cell phones more like computers by 
allowing users to complete tasks such as email.
17
  Today, however, there is 
an app for almost any conceivable task.  There are apps that allow users to 
do tasks as varied as checking the stock market, uploading photos to social 
networking websites, and monitoring sports and fitness goals.
18
  Apple’s 
App Store currently offers over 500,000 apps for download
19
 and the 
                                                                                                                          
8 Allison MacDonald, Comment, YouTubing Down the Stream of Commerce: Eliminating the 
Express Aiming Requirement for Personal Jurisdiction in User-Generated Internet Content Cases, 19 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 519, 532 (2009). 
9 James P. Donahue, Personal Jurisdiction, in INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE 9-1, 9-13 (2011).  
10 MacDonald, supra note 8, at 532–33. 
11 Greg Snodgrass, Note, Business Solutions to the Alien Ownership Restriction, 61 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 457, 459 (2008). 
12 AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., 35% OF AMERICAN ADULTS OWN A SMARTPHONE 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Smartphones.aspx. 
13 Id. at 3. 
14 Id. at 14. 
15 The Apple “App Store” currently makes available over 500,000 apps for download by iPhone 
users.  iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).      
16 David Bell & Hope Hughes, One Bad App Spoils the Bunch: Brand Protection in the App Era, 
74 TEX. B.J. 218, 219 (2011). 
17 What is a Cell Phone App?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-cell-phone-
app.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
18 See iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2011) (listing the different kinds of apps available for download from the Apple “App Store”). 
19 Id. 
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Android Market offers more than 200,000 apps.
20
 
Apps are not created solely by smartphone and software companies.  
There are a number of do-it-yourself app-development websites that guide 
individuals through the steps of creating an app.
21
  Some websites even use 
a simple “point-and-click” technology so that individuals need not know 
how to write code.
22
  Because some of the websites provide the service for 
free
23
 and are relatively easy to use, almost anyone with Internet access can 
create an app.    
Some apps come pre-installed on a smartphone,
24
 while others can be 
downloaded by accessing an app store hosted by the maker of the 
smartphone.
25
  These stores are only accessible when using the 
smartphone.
26
  When a user selects the app that he wants to download, 
information is sent to a host computer requesting the information, and the 
host computer then sends the app files to the smartphone.
27
  Once an app 
has been downloaded and installed, using it is similar to using a 
computer.
28
  Some apps, known as “web apps,” require access to the 
Internet to function after they have been downloaded;
29
 others do not 
require Internet access after the original download.   
Apps and the Internet are similar in many ways.  The most significant 
difference is that the app is downloaded directly to the phone, and 
therefore the app occupies a “physical” presence on the smartphone similar 
to software on a computer.  For the purposes of assessing minimum 
contacts, it is useful to think of apps as a combination between the Internet 
and computer software.  However, because apps are downloaded from the 
Internet and frequently access the Internet after they have been 
downloaded, the comparison to the Internet and websites is stronger than 
the comparison to computer software, which exists solely on an 
individual’s computer. 
                                                                                                                          
20 Kim Komando, Make Your Own Smartphone Apps, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2011, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/kimkomando/story/2011-09-09/Make-your-own-smartphone-
assp/50322124/1.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. (discussing some of the websites that provide app-building services and their cost). 
24 iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
25 Elijah Chau, How Do Apps Work on a Cell Phone?, EHOW.COM (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.ehow.com/facts_7789400_do-apps-work-cell-phone.html. 
26 Id. 
27 See Natalya Shmulevich, Note, A Minimum Contacts and Fairness Examination of Personal 
Jurisdiction over Providers of Free Downloads on the Internet, 13 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 55, 68–69 
(2004) (explaining how Internet downloads work). 
28 Id. 
29 Web Apps, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/webapps/whatarewebapps.html (last visited Nov. 2, 
2011). 
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III.  CURRENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
It is useful to compare smartphone apps to the Internet and to computer 
software because apps essentially combine these two forms of technology.  
Because smartphone apps are similar to the Internet and computer 
programs, perhaps the personal jurisdiction doctrines that would be 
applicable in each of those situations can be applied to apps.  This Part first 
discusses the current state of personal jurisdiction doctrine, as traditional 
principles of personal jurisdiction may be best suited to evaluate whether 
apps create sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.  The Part 
then examines the two most prominent doctrines for determining whether 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the defendant’s Internet 
contacts with the forum state is proper.  Finally, after discussing Internet 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, this Part examines stream-of-commerce 
jurisdiction, which may be applied to the analogy of an app as computer 
software and has also been used in examining contacts on the “electronic 
stream-of-commerce.” 
A.  Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine 
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits a court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any state with which the 
defendant has “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”30  The requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with 
the forum state performs two functions.
31
  First, “[i]t protects the defendant 
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum,”32 an 
interest typically described in terms of “reasonableness or fairness.”33   
Second, “it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach 
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal 
sovereigns in a federal system”;34 this interest is typically referred to in 
terms of “federalism” or “sovereignty.”35  
In determining whether a defendant has established minimum contacts, 
courts will look at the quality of the relationship between the defendant and 
the forum state.  An important inquiry is whether the defendant has 
                                                                                                                          
30 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
31 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980). 
32 Id. at 292. 
33 The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, Personal Jurisdiction 
Stream-of-Commerce Doctrine: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 125 HARV. L. REV. 172, 311 
(2011) [hereinafter Stream-of-Commerce]. 
34 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
35 Stream-of-Commerce, supra note 33, at 311. 
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“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.”36  Courts will also examine whether it was foreseeable that the 
defendant could be haled into court in the forum state based on his contacts 
with the forum.
37
 
If the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, 
the court will next determine whether exercising jurisdiction over the out-
of-state defendant would comport with traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.  A finding of minimum contacts raises the presumption 
that exercising jurisdiction would be fair,
38
 but that presumption may be 
defeated by the particular facts of the case.  Courts will consider: (1) the 
burden on the defendant of having to litigate in a foreign state; (2) the 
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest 
in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.
39
  This fairness inquiry is meant to be applied 
flexibly to account for the facts presented and the circumstances of the 
parties in each case.
40
 
If the defendant has established minimum contacts and the court is 
satisfied that it would not be unfair to subject the defendant to suit in the 
forum state, then the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional. 
B.  Internet Jurisdiction 
When the Internet first came into existence, courts were generally 
reluctant to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on 
the defendant’s Internet contacts with the forum state.41  Fitting the Internet 
                                                                                                                          
36 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
37 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due 
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.  Rather, 
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”). 
38 Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 746 
(2012) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). 
39 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
40 Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply 
the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 446 (1991). 
41 Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 60 (“[C]ourts were reluctant to find jurisdiction without a non-
Internet contact.”).  In one early case, however, the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut exercised personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based solely on the 
defendant’s website.  See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 
1996).  The defendant operated a website advertising its goods and services, and the website contained 
a phone number at which customers could contact the defendant.  Id. at 163.  Treating the website as an 
advertisement which was continuously available on the Internet, the court held that the defendant had 
purposely availed itself of doing business in Connecticut such that personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant was proper.  Id. at 165. 
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into traditional notions of personal jurisdiction posed significant doctrinal 
issues.  Discussing some of these issues, the court in Digital Equipment 
Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.
42
 stated: 
The Internet has no territorial boundaries. . . . [A]s far as the 
Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps “no there 
there,” the “there” is everywhere where there is Internet 
access.  When business is transacted over a computer Web-
site accessed by a computer in Massachusetts, it takes place 
as much in Massachusetts, literally or figuratively, as it does 
anywhere.
43
 
However, as the Internet became a more integral and pervasive technology, 
courts began to exercise personal jurisdiction in cases where a defendant’s 
only contacts with a forum state were Internet based.
44
   
When courts began exercising personal jurisdiction based on a 
defendant’s Internet contacts, they generally relied on traditional personal 
jurisdiction principles.
45
  Many of the cases that upheld the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on the defendant’s 
Internet contacts were predicated on the idea that the defendant was either 
purposefully availing himself of the privilege of doing business in the 
forum state or that the defendant had purposefully directed his activities at 
the state.
46
  In essence, the rationale was that a defendant could have 
structured his or her online conduct so that it was not available in a 
particular forum or was only available in some forums.
47
  However, this 
rationale ignored the realities of the Internet—the Internet is structured 
such that it is not possible to avoid contact with a specific forum apart from 
completely staying off the Internet and thereby avoiding all forums.
48
 
Therefore, as courts searched to determine whether minimum contacts 
existed on a case-by-case basis, an understanding of how the Internet 
functioned became more important to the analysis.
49
  Courts developed 
tests for assessing personal jurisdiction that were specific to the Internet 
context.
50
  This Part discusses the two most prominent Internet jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                          
42 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997). 
43 Id. at 462. 
44 See JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 638 (6th ed. 2008) (“In some cases, 
the existence of a website that is accessible by residents of a given state may be the only ‘contacts’ the 
defendant has within that state.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Donahue, supra note 9, at 9-14. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 9-15. 
49 Nemeyer, supra note 7, at 168–69 (discussing how courts modified their approach to personal 
jurisdiction as they came to better understand the Internet). 
50 HART, supra note 44, at 638. 
 366 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:357 
tests: the Zippo “sliding scale” test and the effects test.51   
    1.  Zippo “Sliding Scale” Test 
In 1997, the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
developed a test to determine whether the Internet contacts of a defendant 
were sufficient to establish minimum contacts.
52
  In Zippo Manufacturing 
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., the court articulated a “sliding scale” test 
wherein “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally 
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial 
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.”53   
The case involved a dispute between two companies over an Internet 
domain name, and the plaintiff sought to sue the defendant, a California 
company, in Pennsylvania.
54
  The defendant did not have any offices, 
employees, or agents in Pennsylvania.
55
  Instead, the defendant’s contacts 
with Pennsylvania occurred almost exclusively through its website, which 
could be accessed from within Pennsylvania.
56
  The website contained 
information about the company, advertisements, and an application for 
customers to receive access to an Internet news service that the defendant 
produced.
57
  A customer who wanted to subscribe to the news service did 
so by filling out an online application and paying a fee either over the 
Internet or the phone.
58
  Approximately two percent of the defendant’s 
subscribers were Pennsylvania residents, and the defendant had contracted 
with seven Internet service providers in Pennsylvania to permit their 
customers to access the defendant’s news service.59  The defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss, claiming that it did not have sufficient minimum 
contacts with Pennsylvania for the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
to be constitutional.
60
 
The court identified three kinds of websites for the purpose of 
determining whether minimum contacts exist: (1) passive websites;  
(2) interactive websites; and (3) websites that fall somewhere between 
passive and active.
61
  Passive websites describe websites where the 
                                                                                                                          
51 Another test used by courts is known as the “totality of contacts” analysis wherein the court 
considers the defendant’s Internet contacts along with the defendant’s more traditional contacts, such as 
physicality.  Id. at 639.  The “totality of contacts” test is not discussed in this Note because the analysis 
considers more than just the Internet contacts of the defendant. 
52 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1120. 
55 Id. at 1121. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1124. 
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defendant has “simply posted information on an Internet [website] which is 
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.”62  In cases such as this, the 
court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is improper.
63
  On the 
other end of the spectrum are interactive websites where the defendant 
“clearly does business over the Internet.”64  Because doing business 
involves “enter[ing] into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction 
that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over 
the Internet,” exercising personal jurisdiction is proper.65  In the middle 
ground are interactive websites where the user can exchange information 
with a host computer.  To determine whether the defendant has sufficient 
minimum contacts in these cases, a court will “examin[e] the level of 
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that 
occurs on the [website].”66  When a website falls into this middle ground, it 
must be shown that the defendant has actually interacted with residents of 
the forum state; simply having the potential to do so through the website is 
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
67
 
The court concluded that the defendant’s website fell into the 
interactive category because the defendant entered into contracts with 
residents and companies of Pennsylvania from which it profited.
68
  Based 
on those contacts with Pennsylvania, the court held that the defendant had 
purposefully availed itself of doing business in Pennsylvania, and 
therefore, jurisdiction was proper.
69
 
Since the sliding scale test was articulated in Zippo, nearly every 
Circuit has adopted the test in one form or another.
70
  A central part of 
                                                                                                                          
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  Most courts have essentially combined the analysis of interactivity and commerciality by 
holding that in order for a website to be interactive, the defendant must profit, or have the potential to 
profit, commercially from the website.  Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 63. 
67 See, e.g., People Solutions, Inc. v. People Solutions, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-2339-L, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10444, at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2000) (“Personal jurisdiction should not be premised on the 
mere possibility, with nothing more, that Defendant may be able to do business with Texans over its 
web site; rather, Plaintiff must show that Defendant has ‘purposefully availed itself’ of the benefits of 
the forum state and its laws.”). 
68 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125. 
69 Id. at 1126–27. 
70 Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal 
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 79 (2011).  Two 
Circuits have explicitly rejected the Zippo framework.  See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 
239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that while the Zippo framework may help frame the judicial inquiry in 
some cases, it does not amount to a separate framework for analyzing Internet jurisdiction cases; 
instead, “traditional statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry” 
(quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, No. 03 Civ. 6585, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7830, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2004))); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510–11 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (holding that traditional notions of personal jurisdiction can and should be adapted to address a 
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Zippo’s continued prominence in assessing Internet jurisdiction cases is 
due to the “court’s translation of . . . amorphous due process principles to 
the Internet setting.”71  However, the Zippo test has faced increasing 
criticism in recent years.
72
  One criticism is that at the time that Zippo was 
decided, many websites were passive; today however, there remain few 
truly passive websites.
73
  As the scope and technological abilities of the 
Internet have increased, the Zippo test has failed to evolve to address new 
factors which may be useful in determining whether a defendant has 
established minimum contacts with the forum state.
74
 
    2.  Calder v. Jones Effects Test 
Many courts have also adopted the “effects test”under which 
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper if the 
defendant directed his or her activity at a particular forumto address 
Internet personal jurisdiction cases.
75
  The effects test was first articulated 
in Calder v. Jones,
76
 wherein the plaintiff Shirley Jones brought suit in 
California claiming that she had been libeled by an article written and 
edited by the defendants in Florida.
77
  The article was published in a 
weekly newspaper with a circulation of approximately 600,000 in 
California, the state in which Jones lived and worked.
78
  Aside from the 
circulation of the newspaper, the defendant did not have any substantial, or 
indeed minimum, contacts with the state.
79
  However, the Supreme Court 
held that personal jurisdiction over the defendants in California was proper 
because “California [is] the focal point both of the story and of the harm 
suffered.”80  The Court went on to hold that personal jurisdiction is proper 
where a defendant purposefully aims its actions at the forum state, 
knowing that the injury would be felt most strongly there, because the 
                                                                                                                          
defendant’s Internet contacts).  Additionally, the Eleventh and Federal Circuits have not definitively 
adopted or rejected the Zippo test.  See Roblor Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. GPS Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 
1130, 1140–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that the Federal Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit had not 
expressly adopted or rejected the Zippo test).    
71 King, supra note 70, at 81. 
72 See Donahue, supra note 9, at 9-22–9-24 (citing cases which have rejected or criticized the 
Zippo framework). 
73 Id. at 9-22. 
74 See King, supra note 70, at 86 (arguing that the Zippo test has failed to adapt to the fact that 
many websites now employ geolocation technologies, a potentially important factor to be considered in 
the jurisdictional analysis). 
75 Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 65. 
76 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
77 Id. at 784. 
78 Id. at 785. 
79 Id. at 785–86. 
80 Id. at 789. 
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defendant can “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”81 
A few courts have exercised personal jurisdiction under the effects test 
even in the absence of evidence that the activity was specifically targeted 
on the theory that personal jurisdiction is proper whenever harm occurs in 
the forum state.
82
  Most courts, however, hold that “the mere allegation that 
the plaintiff feels the effect of the defendant’s tortious conduct in the forum 
because the plaintiff is located there is insufficient to satisfy Calder.”83 
It should be noted that the Zippo test and the effects test are not 
mutually exclusive because the applicability of the effects test has 
generally been limited to intellectual property and intentional tort claims.
84
  
C.  Stream of Commerce 
Stream of commerce doctrine was developed to apply to situations in 
which a defendant distributes products through a third party rather than by 
direct sales to customers, and the product is swept into the forum state 
through the “stream of commerce.”85  The Supreme Court’s leading stream 
of commerce case is Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.
86
  In 
Asahi, the Court was asked to determine whether  
the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the 
components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the 
United States would reach the forum State in the stream of 
commerce constitutes “minimum contacts” between the 
defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of 
jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”87 
Divided into four-Justice pluralities, the Court was unable to decide 
whether the defendant had established minimum contacts.
88
  Thus, the 
Justices articulated three different standards for establishing minimum 
contacts through the stream of commerce. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion stated that “[t]he placement of a product 
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant 
                                                                                                                          
81 Id. at 789–90 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).  
82 HART, supra note 44, at 677 (citing Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Green, No. 01 C 2948, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14317, at *9–11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2001)); see, e.g., Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 
F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (exercising personal jurisdiction where an out-of-state defendant’s sole 
contact with the forum state was that he committed a tort and the harm was felt in the forum state). 
83 IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998). 
84 Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 65. 
85 Erik T. Moe, Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce 
Doctrine, Barely Alive but Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 203 (1987). 
86 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
87 Id. at 105. 
88 Id. 
 370 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:357 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”89  This test is often referred 
to as “stream of commerce plus.”  A court may find purposeful direction 
where the defendant takes actions such as “designing the product for the 
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing 
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or 
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the 
sales agent in the forum State.”90  However, mere awareness that the 
product will enter a forum state is not enough.
91
 
Justice Brennan, in contrast, articulated a pure stream of commerce 
view where a showing of additional conduct purposefully directed at the 
forum state is unnecessary to establish personal jurisdiction.
92
  Justice 
Brennan stated, “[a]s long as a participant [in placing a product into the 
stream of commerce] is aware that the final product is being marketed in 
the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a 
surprise.”93    
Finally, Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurrence in which he argued 
that whether a defendant’s conduct constitutes purposeful availment such 
that sufficient minimum contacts are established is affected “by the 
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components” placed 
into the stream of commerce.
94
  Referencing the facts of the case, Justice 
Stevens concluded that “a regular course of dealing that results in 
deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years 
would constitute ‘purposeful availment’ even though the item delivered to 
the forum State was a standard product marketed throughout the world.”95 
When stream of commerce doctrine is applied to personal jurisdiction 
disputes based on the “electronic stream of commerce,” Justice 
O’Connor’s test has prevailed.96  In a recent Supreme Court decision 
addressing stream of commerce doctrine, Justice Breyer rhetorically 
questioned the application of stream of commerce plus analysis to cases 
where the defendant “targets the world by selling products from its Web 
site.”97  He further questioned how it would apply to situations where 
instead of shipping products directly to consumers, the defendant 
“consigns the products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who 
                                                                                                                          
89 Id. at 112. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product 
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”). 
92 Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
95 Id. 
96 Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on the 
Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 932 (1998). 
97 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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then receives and fulfills the orders.”98  Lower courts have exercised 
personal jurisdiction over defendants in both of Justice Breyer’s scenarios, 
finding that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the laws of 
the forum state by sending their products there.
99
  In the first scenario, 
where the defendant directly sells and ships the goods, courts have 
generally relied on the Zippo test to find personal jurisdiction.
100
  In the 
second scenario, courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over 
defendants in situations where the defendant conducts its business through 
an entity such as eBay or Amazon and offers shipping of its products 
throughout the United States and the world,
101
 finding that the defendants 
had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in 
the forum state.
102
   
IV.  APPS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Because no court has ruled on the issue of personal jurisdiction and 
smartphone apps, this Part applies the different doctrines discussed in Part 
III to the fact pattern at the beginning of this Note to determine whether a 
court would find that the app created sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum state such that personal jurisdiction is proper.  Part IV.A. discusses 
the minimum contacts analysis.  However, finding sufficient minimum 
contacts does not end the inquiry because a court must then determine 
whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would comply 
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
103
  Therefore, 
this second step of the personal jurisdiction inquiry is discussed in Part 
IV.B.    
A.  Minimum Contacts 
     1.  Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine 
Under the traditional doctrine, courts examine three elements to 
determine whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum state to be subjected to jurisdiction there: (1) the quality of the 
relationship between the defendant and the forum state;
104
 (2) whether the 
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the laws of the jurisdiction;
105
 
                                                                                                                          
98 Id. 
99 Stream-of-Commerce, supra note 33, at 318–19. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 319. 
102 See Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (exercising personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who conducted business through eBay). 
103 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
104 Id. at 319. 
105 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
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and (3) whether being haled into court in the forum jurisdiction was 
foreseeable.
106
   
In the fact pattern previously presented, the quality of the relationship 
between the defendant and Connecticut is relatively low.  The defendant’s 
contacts with Connecticut are not of the type to which courts generally 
look to find minimum contacts.  The defendant does not live in 
Connecticut
107
 and has never been to Connecticut.  The defendant has not 
physically mailed or sent anything to Connecticut.
108
  The defendant’s only 
contact with Connecticut is the app, and the app was transmitted over the 
Internet by a third party.  By traditional standards, the quality of this 
contact is weak. 
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that the defendant 
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activity in 
Connecticut.  The defendant created the app with the intention that it 
would be downloaded worldwide.  The more times the app is downloaded, 
the more income the defendant will receive (either directly from the sale of 
the app or from advertising revenues), and therefore the defendant has 
incentive to direct the app to the entire world.   
It is true, however, that the defendant did not specifically reach out and 
avail himself of the laws of Connecticut.
109
  Rather than reaching out to 
Connecticut, the defendant essentially reached out to every forum.  
However, the purposeful availment remains.  This fact may be illustrated 
by the facts presented in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
110
  The 
defendant, Hustler Magazine, was an Ohio-based corporation in the 
business of publishing and circulating a magazine nationwide, including in 
New Hampshire.
111
  The plaintiff brought suit for libel in New Hampshire, 
and the Court held that personal jurisdiction was proper.
112
  Even though 
the defendant had not specifically reached out to New Hampshire more 
than any other jurisdiction, because the magazines were circulated in New 
Hampshire, the defendant had availed itself of the opportunity to engage in 
in-state activities.
113
  
The same reasoning can be applied to the contacts in question here.  
The defendant profits from making the app available to consumers in 
                                                                                                                          
106 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
107 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878) (“Where a party is within a territory, he may 
justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process 
against him.”). 
108 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that personal jurisdiction 
was proper where the defendant mailed various documents to the plaintiff in California). 
109 See id. (finding that the defendant reached out to California when it specifically mailed 
documents to an individual living there). 
110 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
111 Id. at 772. 
112 Id. at 773. 
113 Id. at 774. 
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Connecticut and every state.  The mere fact that the defendant has 
purposefully availed himself of doing business everywhere does not 
minimize the fact that he purposefully availed himself of doing business in 
Connecticut.
114
  Thus, a court would likely conclude that the defendant 
purposefully availed himself of the laws of Connecticut.   
It is also likely that a court would determine that it was foreseeable that 
the defendant could be haled into court in the forum state.  Smartphone 
apps are made available to consumers through online “stores” that can be 
accessed from a user’s smartphone.115  Because these stores are available 
anywhere that smartphones can access the Internet, apps are likewise 
available for download anywhere a user may access the Internet.  As a 
result, it was foreseeable to the defendant that he could be haled into court 
anywhere that smartphones can access the Internet, which is virtually 
everywhere. 
So would a court hold that there are sufficient minimum contacts to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant?  Probably.  In coming to 
this conclusion, it is helpful to compare the factual scenario at hand to 
another case that dealt with similar relevant facts.   
In Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC,
116
 the Second Circuit 
held that sufficient minimum contacts existed between the defendant and 
New York, the forum state, to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.
117
  Queen Bee, an Alabama corporation, operated a website 
which sold counterfeit designer bags to consumers throughout the United 
States and select locations worldwide.
118
  The defendant’s only contacts 
with New York were its website and the fact that at least one bag had been 
sold to a customer in New York.
119
  By selling at least one bag to a 
customer in New York, the court stated that the defendant had 
“purposefully avail[ed] [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.”120  Furthermore, because the bag was actually purchased and 
shipped to a customer in New York, as opposed to a New York resident 
                                                                                                                          
114 See Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that personal 
jurisdiction was proper where a sales agreement indicating that a product would be sold worldwide was 
evidence of an attempt to serve the market of the forum state). 
115 See supra Part II. 
116 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010). 
117 Id. at 171.  I purposefully selected a case from the Second Circuit because the Second Circuit 
has not adopted the Zippo test.  See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007).  
Because this section of the Note is devoted to assessing minimum contacts under traditional personal 
jurisdiction doctrine, and the Zippo framework is discussed in Part IV.A.2, using a case that assessed 
Internet contacts without relying on Zippo is necessary to distinguish the two doctrinal approaches. 
118 Chloe, 616 F.3d at 162. 
119 Id. at 171. 
120 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 
(1985)). 
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merely viewing the defendant’s website, “there can be no doubt that [the 
defendant’s] conduct was ‘purposefully directed toward the forum 
State.’”121  Even though the defendant’s contacts with the forum state were 
fairly limited, the court held that sufficient minimum contacts existed 
because the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of 
conducting activities in New York. 
The facts in the present case are similar.  While the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state are limited to creating an app that can be, and 
was, downloaded in the forum state, the defendant has purposefully availed 
itself of the privilege to conduct activity within the forum state.  Therefore, 
a court would likely determine that sufficient minimum contacts exist.     
     2.  Zippo “Sliding Scale” Test 
The Zippo test evaluates a defendant’s Internet contacts by examining 
the nature and the quality of the commercial activity that a defendant 
conducts over the Internet.
122
  In attempting to evaluate that activity, the 
Zippo framework instructs courts to place a defendant’s website into one 
of three categories: (1) passive; (2) interactive; or (3) between passive and 
interactive.
123
 
In the present case, the defendant’s app is not a website, per se.  
However, for the purposes of the minimum contacts inquiry, the two can 
and should be treated the same.
124
  Under the Zippo framework, the app 
likely falls in the middle ground between passive and interactive.  To begin 
with, the app is downloaded from the Internet.  Because the download 
involves an interaction between the smartphone and the host computer, the 
app is not passive.
125
  Furthermore, the app itself is not passive.  The app 
does more than simply provide uniform information to the user; it provides 
a search function so that users can look up the weather for a particular 
location.  This search function is another exchange of information between 
the user and the host computer; therefore, the app is not passive.   
Additionally, the app is at least minimally commercial because the 
defendant profits from making the app available.  Although the app may be 
downloaded for free, the defendant provides advertising space on the apps.  
The more times that the app is downloaded, the more the defendant is able 
to charge for the advertising space.  Therefore, the defendant profits from 
making the app widely available.   
At the same time, however, the defendant’s app does not fall into the 
interactive category.  To determine if the website is interactive, courts look 
                                                                                                                          
121 Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). 
122 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
123 Id. 
124 See supra Part II. 
125 See Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 76. 
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to whether the defendant conducts business and enters into contracts over 
the Internet, and whether the defendant engages in a knowing and repeated 
transmission of files over the Internet.
126
  Apart from providing advertising 
space on the apps, the defendant does not conduct business over the 
Internet because the app may be downloaded for free.
127
  The defendant 
does enter into agreements over the Internet because when a user 
downloads the defendant’s app, or any other app, he must agree to the 
terms and conditions of the provided click-wrap agreement.
128
  However, 
this agreement is not a traditional contract for goods or services as 
envisioned by the Zippo court because there is no monetary exchange.  
Finally, the defendant does not engage in the knowing and repeated 
transmission of files over the Internet.  While the defendant’s host 
computer transmits files and information over the Internet, it is not clear 
that the transmission is “knowingly” conducted by the defendant.  The 
download and search functions are automated, so the defendant does not 
actively engage in contact with users once the app has been created.       
As a result, the app likely falls somewhere in the middle ground 
between passive and interactive.  When an app falls in this category, courts 
assess whether there are sufficient minimum contacts by looking to the 
level of interactivity, the commercial nature of the website, and the extent 
of actual interaction between the defendant’s website and residents of the 
forum state.
129
 
In the present case, the level of interactivity is moderate.  The user 
interacts with the host computer when he downloads the app and 
subsequently whenever he conducts a search using the app.  Additionally, 
an argument has been made that the geolocation aspect of an app should 
militate in favor of finding minimum contacts.
130
  Customizing the app to 
account for the location in which it is being used constitutes a form of 
interactivity.
131
  However, the interactivity is not as high as the interactivity 
of a website that allows a user to make purchases online, for instance.  The 
app simply provides the information that is queried.  A website that allows 
purchases, on the other hand, creates a sales agreement, charges the 
individual’s form of payment, sends out confirmation emails, and puts the 
                                                                                                                          
126 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
127 See Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 76.  If users were required to pay for the app, that would 
constitute doing business over the Internet. 
128 A “click-wrap agreement” is a contract that is created when “one party sets up a proposed 
electronic form agreement to which another party may assent by clicking an icon or a button or by 
typing in a set of specified words.”  Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for 
Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 401 (2001). 
129 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
130 See King, supra note 70, at 90 (arguing that when websites use geolocation technology to 
customize their content, that technology increases the interactivity of the website under the Zippo 
analysis). 
131 Id. 
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order into production.   
The commercial nature of the app is also moderate.  The defendant 
does not directly profit by selling a good to the user.  Instead, the 
commercial nature is indirect because the defendant solicits advertisers 
who pay the defendant for allowing them to, at least theoretically, profit 
from the app’s users.  However, the link between soliciting advertisements 
and finding that the app is of a commercial nature should not be 
understated.  The case law supports the assertion that when a defendant 
website owner profits by selling ad space on his website, that commercial 
transaction makes it more likely that personal jurisdiction is proper.  In 
Gather, Inc. v. Gatheroo, LLC,
132
 the court assessed how advertisements 
on the defendant’s website affected the jurisdictional analysis.133  The 
defendant solicited advertisers to place ads on its website, and those 
advertisements were made available to users in the forum state.
134
  Because 
the defendant essentially solicited revenue from users who viewed its 
website by exposing them to the advertisements, the court held that 
personal jurisdiction was proper.
135
  Likewise, in LFG, LLC v. Zapata 
Corp.,
136
 the court held that minimum contacts existed under the Zippo 
framework when the defendant’s website contained advertisements.137  The 
defendant encouraged users to join the website’s mailing list in order to 
increase the number of subscribers because by increasing that number, the 
defendant’s ability to earn revenue from advertisements on its website 
increased.
138
 
The last factor to which courts look—the extent of the interaction 
between the website and residents of the forum state—weighs in favor of 
exercising personal jurisdiction.  Because the app has been downloaded 
and continues to be available for download in Connecticut, there is 
considerable interaction between the app and residents of Connecticut.   
Weighing the interactivity of the app and the commercial nature, a 
court would likely conclude that the app creates sufficient minimum 
contacts with the forum state.  While the advertisements alone are 
insufficient to create minimum contacts
139
 and the interactivity of the app 
is insufficient to create minimum contacts without also having the 
                                                                                                                          
132 443 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. Mass 2006). 
133 Id. at 116. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 78 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
137 Id. at 736–37. 
138 Id. at 737. 
139 Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 63–64 (citing Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). 
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commercial aspect,
140
 taken together, the contacts are likely sufficient to 
establish sufficient minimum contacts such that personal jurisdiction would 
be proper under Zippo. 
 3.  Calder v. Jones Effects Test 
The effects test is premised on the idea that personal jurisdiction is 
proper when the jurisdiction is the focal point of where the harm has been 
suffered and the defendant purposefully aimed his activities at the forum 
state.
141
  Because the defendant aimed his activities at the forum state, he 
can reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
142
  
In the present case, the plaintiff brought the action in the state where it 
is incorporated and headquartered.  Because the defendant’s app infringes 
on the plaintiff’s ability to profit by using its data without paying the 
licensing fee, the harm is felt at the plaintiff’s principal place of business, 
and therefore Connecticut is the focal point of the harm suffered. 
Most courts agree, however, that it is not enough that the harm of the 
defendant’s conduct is felt in the forum state;143 the defendant must have 
also purposefully directed his activities at the forum state.  In the present 
case, it is doubtful that a court would find that the creator of the app 
purposefully directed his activities at the forum state.  It is unknown 
whether the defendant knew that the plaintiff’s principal place of business 
was in Connecticut.  It is also unknown whether the defendant even knew 
that he was stealing the plaintiff’s data because it is possible that he was 
taking it from one of the plaintiff’s licensees.   
An argument could be made that the geolocation aspect of the app 
suggests that the defendant purposefully directed his activities at the forum 
state.  However, the same issue arises as with purposeful availment in the 
Internet context: because the defendant has directed his activities at every 
state, does that lessen the fact that the app is also customized for the forum 
state?
144
  For the purposes of the effects test, it likely would.  The effects 
test examines whether there was purposeful direction to determine whether 
litigating in a particular forum would have been foreseeable to the 
defendant, and therefore, directing activities at every state through a 
geolocation device would unlikely be sufficient to satisfy the purposeful 
                                                                                                                          
140 See id. at 76 (“Regardless of how the term interactive is defined, there can be no personal 
jurisdiction over [the defendant] because its activity on the web site is not commercial.”). 
141 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1983). 
142 Id. 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 82–83. 
144 Kevin F. King does not address this issue.  Rather, he addresses the effects test under a 
defamation hypothetical and concludes that because the comments are addressed towards a resident of 
the forum state, the presence of geolocation technology on a website would be superfluous to the 
inquiry.  King, supra note 70, at 90–91. 
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direction prong. 
Without specific evidence that the defendant knew that he would cause 
harm to the plaintiff in Connecticut and that he purposefully directed his 
actions there, a court would be unlikely to find that the defendant could 
have reasonably anticipated being haled into court there.  Therefore, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would not be proper.  
     4.  Stream of Commerce 
The stream of commerce test is meant to assess a defendant’s contacts 
with the forum state where the defendant placed a good into the stream of 
commerce and the good ended up in the forum state.  The issue of apps, as 
with the Internet, is similar to the stream of commerce, in that once the app 
is created, the creator “may have some idea of where it will end up, but not 
total control.”145  In this case, the defendant placed his app into the 
electronic stream of commerce.  He created the app and then submitted it 
to one of the smartphone retailers so that it would be available to 
smartphone users through an online store such as Apple’s App Store or 
Android’s Marketplace.  The user then downloaded the app, bringing it 
into the forum state.   
Courts have held that personal jurisdiction is proper where the 
defendant sells its products through an online retailer.
146
  However, more 
than simply putting the product into the stream of commerce is required 
under Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce plus” doctrine, which is 
the most widely accepted doctrine for evaluating electronic stream of 
commerce cases.
147
  To find sufficient minimum contacts, the defendant 
must have purposefully directed its products at the forum state.
148
  This 
requirement makes sense “[b]ecause a web site is accessible at all times to 
Internet users in any particular forum, [so] it is reasonable to require 
additional conduct. . . . Otherwise, personal jurisdiction over [app] creators 
would have no rational limits.”149  The courts are divided regarding exactly 
how much more additional conduct is required to find sufficient minimum 
contacts.  Some courts have concluded that any additional conduct is 
sufficient,
150
 while others have required additional conduct related to the 
plaintiff’s claim, such as shipping offending products into the forum state 
or entering into “agreements to provide online services to substantial 
                                                                                                                          
145 MacDonald, supra note 8, at 548. 
146 Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
147 Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 96, at 932. 
148 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987). 
149 Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 96, at 939. 
150 Id.  For example, one court found that there was sufficient additional conduct when the 
defendant’s website had six subscribers who lived in the forum state.  Am. Network, Inc. v. Access 
America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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numbers of forum state residents.”151  
In the present case, the defendant has done more than simply create a 
website.  While the app is in many ways analogous to a website for the 
minimum contacts inquiry, the app itself is more: it is downloaded onto the 
smartphone and is accessible at any time.  It is as if the user has physically 
downloaded computer software onto his phone.  Furthermore, the app 
satisfies the two foregoing examples of how that additional conduct can be 
satisfied.  The defendant essentially ships the app into the forum state over 
the electronic stream of commerce, and when the app is downloaded, the 
defendant is agreeing to provide online services (i.e. weather data) to the 
user.   
Additionally, the use of geolocation technology potentially plays an 
important role in the stream of commerce inquiry.  The defendant has 
purposefully customized the product for use in the forum state.  When 
looking for purposeful direction, courts frequently look to whether the 
defendant has customized the product in some way for the forum, such as a 
French company’s labeling of water bottles in ounces rather than metric 
measurements so that they can be sold in the American market.
152
  
Likewise, the defendant’s app would be essentially useless to users in 
Connecticut if the app only displayed the weather for California.  Because 
the defendant purposefully chose to tailor the app to a user’s location, he 
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court wherever the app was 
accessed.   
When the defendant created the app and made it available for 
download from one of the various smartphone app stores, the defendant 
placed his app into the stream of commerce.  By utilizing geolocation 
technology and doing more than simply creating a website, the defendant 
purposefully directed his activities at the forum state.  Therefore, a court 
would likely conclude that minimum contacts are satisfied. 
B.  Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
If a court holds that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts 
with the forum state, the court must then determine whether exercising 
jurisdiction over the defendant would comply with traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.  The court will consider (1) the burden on 
the defendant of having to litigate in a foreign state; (2) the forum state’s 
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest 
                                                                                                                          
151 Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 96, at 939. 
152 See In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 754 F. Supp. 264, 268 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Perrier was valid under the stream-of-commerce doctrine because 
Perrier had designed its product for the U.S. market by labeling the bottles in ounces rather than metric 
measurements).  
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in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the 
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.
153
      
 1.  The Burden on the Defendant 
The burden on the defendant is the most important of the five factors 
because it lies at the heart of the fairness inquiry.
154
  While a plaintiff can 
decide not to sue or to sue elsewhere if the burden of trial is too great, a 
defendant does not have such an alternative.
155
  In examining the 
defendant’s burden, courts will consider such factors as the distance 
between the defendant’s state of residence and the forum state,156 the 
defendant’s financial resources (in absolute terms and as compared to the 
plaintiff),
157
 and the defendant’s ability to retain local counsel in the forum 
state.
158
 
In the present case, the burden on the defendant is likely to be heavy.  
The defendant lives in California and the plaintiff has filed suit in 
Connecticut.  Courts have given significant weight to the burden on the 
defendant in the fairness inquiry when the defendant was faced with a 
similar distance between his home state and the forum.
159
  Additionally, 
there are no mitigating factors to suggest that the distance is not a 
significant burden for the defendant.  Many apps, including the one in the 
fact pattern, are created by a single individual who saw a need or an 
interest in a particular kind of app.  Because the barriers to entry are quite 
low, almost anyone, including teenagers, can create an app.  Therefore, the 
burden on the defendant will be high if he has to travel to Connecticut to 
defend the instant lawsuit.  Additionally, the disparity in financial 
resources between the plaintiff and the defendant suggest that it would be 
                                                                                                                          
153 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
154 See id. (stating that the burden on the defendant is a primary concern in evaluating the 
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant in the forum state). 
155 Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981). 
156 See Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[M]ost of the 
cases that have been dismissed on grounds of unreasonableness are cases in which the defendant’s 
center of gravity, be it place of residence or place of business, was located at an appreciable distance 
from the forum.”). 
157 See Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that the burden on the defendant of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction was insignificant because 
the defendant was a large corporation with substantial financial resources and the plaintiffs had a 
combined annual salary of only $37,833). 
158 See Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir. 1988) (determining that the 
burden on the defendant was not unduly heavy because he was represented by an attorney in the forum 
state). 
159 See, e.g., Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 210 (“The burden associated with forcing a California 
resident to appear in a Massachusetts court is onerous in terms of distance. . . . This burden, and its 
inevitable concomitant, great inconvenience, are entitled to substantial weight in calibrating the 
jurisdictional scales.”). 
 2012] DOWNLOADING MINIMUM CONTACTS 381 
unfair to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in Connecticut.  The 
defendant will be forced to hire local counsel and travel to Connecticut to 
defend the suit; such actions may cripple the defendant financially and 
impose a significant burden.  However, even serious burdens on a 
defendant are not dispositive and may be outweighed by other factors.
160
 
 2.  The Forum State’s Interest 
The forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute is one of the most 
important of the five factors in the fairness inquiry.
161
  When considering 
the state’s interest, courts consider whether the forum state has “a 
legitimate concern with the outcome of the litigation,” most commonly 
because of the forum state’s interest in applying its own law or the need to 
protect residents of the forum.
162
  The Supreme Court has articulated that a 
state “has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient 
forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.”163  However, 
it is unclear what factors would make a forum state’s interest stronger or 
weaker. 
Connecticut has a significant interest in adjudicating the dispute in the 
present case.  The company has suffered harm by an out-of-state actor, and 
Connecticut has an interest in providing the company with a convenient 
forum in which to litigate.  Additionally, Connecticut has enacted laws 
such as the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
164
 to protect the public 
from unfair practices involving trade or commerce.
165
  Such actions by the 
state legislature suggest that Connecticut has an interest it applying its own 
law in the present case.  Therefore, Connecticut has a strong interest in 
adjudicating the present dispute. 
 3.  The Plaintiff’s Interest 
Many courts conclude, with little discussion, that the plaintiff has an 
interest in adjudicating his claim in the forum where it was filed.
166
  After 
all, the plaintiff likely selected the forum for a reason.  As a result, a 
number courts have de-emphasized the importance of this factor, finding 
                                                                                                                          
160 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“[W]hen minimum 
contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of 
jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”). 
161 Abramson, supra note 40, at 451. 
162 Id. at 452. 
163 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985).  When the plaintiff is not a 
resident of the forum state, the state’s “legitimate interests in the dispute have considerably 
diminished.”  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.  
164 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b (2006). 
165 Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merch. of Conn., 275 Conn. 363, 380, 880 A.2d 138, 149 (2005). 
166 See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 1991) (“No doctorate in astrophysics 
is required to deduce that trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiff’s preference.”). 
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that the plaintiff’s convenience does not significantly influence the fairness 
inquiry.
167
  However, many courts will examine the weight of the 
plaintiff’s interest by considering such factors as the plaintiff’s likelihood 
of recovery or enforcing a judgment in another forum and the 
(in)convenience of litigating elsewhere.
168
 
In the present case, the plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery would 
unlikely to be affected if the case were litigated in another forum.  While 
there may be some, ever so slight advantage to having a “home-town” 
jury,
169
 there is nothing to suggest that litigating in another state would 
truly affect the plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery.  Courts examining this 
factor are generally concerned with the ability of a plaintiff to recover or 
enforce a judgment entered in a foreign jurisdiction;
170
 unless there are 
specific reasons that litigating in a particular forum within the United 
States would be unfair, any plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery should be 
substantially the same across all states.  Therefore, this factor does not 
suggest that the plaintiff’s interest in litigating in the forum state is 
significant. 
The inconvenience of litigating in another forum is also not 
significantly weighty.  It will certainly be easier for the plaintiff to litigate 
in the state where the company is incorporated, but courts balance the 
plaintiff’s convenience against that of the defendant.  When the plaintiff is 
a corporate entity, with the resources to litigate in another forum, “the 
weight a court accords to the plaintiff’s interest is not as significant.”171  
Because the plaintiff in the current case is better equipped to litigate in a 
distant forum than is the defendant, a court is unlikely to find that the 
plaintiff’s interest in litigating in Connecticut is very strong.  
Because the above factors do not suggest that the plaintiff has a 
particularly strong interest in litigating its claim in Connecticut, this factor 
weighs only slightly in favor of the plaintiff.  
                                                                                                                          
167 See, e.g., Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although 
the importance of the forum to the plaintiff nominally remains part of this test, cases have cast doubt on 
its significance . . . [the plaintiff’s] convenience does not significantly influence our analysis.”).  But cf. 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the 
plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the 
alien defendant.”). 
168 Abramson, supra note 40, at 456–58. 
169 See Queen Uno Ltd. P’ship v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352 (D. 
Colo. 1998) (discussing how jurors may be biased in favor of a local company that is a major employer 
for the area). 
170 See, e.g., Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Golf Ass’n, 728 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (D. Ariz. 1990) 
(finding the plaintiff’s interest to be significant where a foreign court would not enforce U.S. antitrust 
laws). 
171 Abramson, supra note 40, at 457. 
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4.  The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest 
In evaluating this factor, courts seek to determine whether it would be 
efficient to litigate the case in the forum state.  As one court has stated, 
“[k]ey to this inquiry are the location of the witnesses, where the wrong 
underlying the lawsuit occurred, what forum’s substantive law governs the 
case, and whether jurisdiction is necessary to prevent piecemeal 
litigation.”172 
Many of the witnesses in the present case are likely located in 
Connecticut because the plaintiff will likely call a number of its employees 
as witnesses.  There will also be witnesses located in California (who could 
attest to the defendant’s conduct) and in other areas of the United States 
(such as technology experts who can testify to how the defendant acquired 
the plaintiff’s weather information).  However, Connecticut is likely home 
to the greatest number of witnesses. 
It is unclear where the wrong underlying the suit occurred.  It could be 
argued that it occurred in California when the defendant created the app.  It 
could be argued that the wrong essentially happened in cyberspace and did 
not physically occur anywhere.  It could be argued that because the harm 
was felt in Connecticut, the wrong occurred in Connecticut.  However, it is 
unclear where a court would conclude the harm occurred. 
Because the plaintiff chose to bring the case in Connecticut, the 
plaintiff likely chose to invoke Connecticut substantive law.  There is 
nothing to suggest that the law of any other state would apply to this 
dispute. 
Finally, the fact pattern does not address whether there will be other 
parties joined in the suit.  Assuming no other parties are joined, there is not 
a concern for piecemeal litigation. 
Therefore, Connecticut is almost certainly the most efficient forum in 
which to litigate the case, and this factor weighs in favor of exercising 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Connecticut.  However, most 
courts accord the interstate judicial system’s interest in the efficient 
resolution of controversies less weight than is given to the defendant’s 
interest, the plaintiff’s interest, and the forum state’s interest.173 
 5.  The Shared Interest of the Several States 
Finally, courts consider the shared interest of the several states in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.  What this means is that 
the court must consider the “procedural and substantive policies of other 
[states and] nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of 
                                                                                                                          
172 Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1163 (10th Cir. 2010). 
173 Abramson, supra note 40, at 460. 
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jurisdiction by the [forum state].”174  In reality, however, few courts give 
this factor individualized consideration (or indeed consideration at all) 
because they treat it as closely related to the to interstate judicial system’s 
interest and the forum state’s interest.175  The exception is when the dispute 
is between nations, rather than states, because there may be significant 
sovereignty concerns.
176
 
In the present case, the parties are both domestic, so a court is unlikely 
to give the shared interests of the several states much consideration.  There 
likely is a shared interest between the states in providing a forum for 
residents (both individual and corporate) when they are harmed.  This 
shared interest would certainly weigh in favor of exercising personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant in Connecticut and, as discussed previously, 
Connecticut’s interest is fairly strong.  However, because courts are 
reluctant to give this factor much, if any, consideration, a court would 
likely find that this factor only weighs slightly in favor of exercising 
jurisdiction in Connecticut. 
 6.  Weighing the Factors 
It is unclear how a court would balance these factors because courts 
differ significantly on how much weight they ascribe to each factor.  Only 
the first factor weighs in favor of the defendant so, all things being equal, it 
would appear that the plaintiff and Connecticut should prevail.  However, 
there is an argument to be made that a court in Connecticut should not 
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.  Although four factors favor the 
plaintiff and exercising jurisdiction in Connecticut, with the exception of 
the forum state’s interest, they do not strongly favor exercising jurisdiction 
in Connecticut.  Therefore, if the analysis essentially boils down to 
balancing the forum state’s interest in protecting its citizens against the 
significant burden imposed on the defendant of having to litigate in a 
distant state, it seems just that the defendant prevail.  Connecticut may 
have an interest in protecting its citizens, but we should have faith that its 
citizens would also be adequately and fairly protected in the courts of other 
states.  The defendant, however, may not be able to adequately defend 
himself in Connecticut because of the potentially staggering costs of 
frequent trips across the United States and obtaining local counsel.  If the 
crux of the inquiry is meant to be fairness, would it not be more fair to 
protect the interests of an individual over the interests of a state? 
This argument is not meant to be predictive, but rather it is meant to 
                                                                                                                          
174 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (emphasis omitted). 
175 Abramson, supra note 40, at 465. 
176 See id. at 465–68 (discussing judicial consideration of the “shared interests” factor with regard 
to international and domestic defendants). 
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show that perhaps this case would be a close call—indeed, many courts 
would likely conclude that exercising personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant in Connecticut would be fair.  However, the low barriers to entry 
for creating apps increases the probability that legally unsophisticated 
individuals with limited means will be pitted against large corporations.  In 
such situations, even though minimum contacts may exist, the courts 
should thoughtfully consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over 
such an individual would in fact comply with traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Because courts have not evaluated personal jurisdiction doctrine as it 
relates to apps, the question raised by apps can only be addressed by 
analogizing to issues that the courts have previously addressed.  As shown 
above, there are a number of ways in which minimum contacts can be 
assessed, but which makes the most sense for apps? 
The traditional personal jurisdiction analysis remains the best way to 
assess whether sufficient minimum contacts are established through a 
smartphone app and whether personal jurisdiction is proper.  Apps do not 
fit squarely into the Internet jurisdiction frameworks because they are 
something more than just a website.  Additionally, they do not fit well into 
stream of commerce or electronic stream-of-commerce because apps are at 
once both a good and electronic.  
The traditional analysis, on the other hand, has the flexibility to take 
into account all of the ways that the defendant, through the app, interacts 
with a forum state.  As shown in Part IV, much of the analysis is very fact-
sensitive, and that fact-sensitivity is needed when assessing apps because 
they are all so different.  Not all apps are free.  Not all apps utilize 
geolocation technology.  Not all apps even need to access the Internet after 
they have been downloaded.  A specialized framework cannot account for 
all of these differences, and in fact the Zippo framework has been criticized 
for precisely that failure.
177
  What is needed is a balanced approach that 
accounts for the all of the complexities and unique characteristics of apps, 
and that can only be accomplished by assessing apps under the traditional 
personal jurisdiction analysis. 
                                                                                                                          
177 See King, supra note 70, at 83 (stating that some circuits have criticized Zippo for being too 
simplistic for regular use). 
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